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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CRIMINAL LAW, MORAL THEORY, AND FEMINISM: SOME
REFLECTIONS ON THE SUBJECT AND ON THE FUN (AND VALUE)
OF COURTING CONTROVERSY

JOSHUA DRESSLER*
I am going to be a bit unfair. The Saint Louis University Law Journal’s
invitation to me to participate in this issue allows me the luxury of satisfying
two goals. The first is to take the opportunity, simply, to reflect (reminisce?)
on slightly more than a quarter-century of teaching Criminal Law. I love the
subject and hope most professors of the course feel as I do, but most of all I
hope my excitement for the subject, unabated after twenty-seven years, will
spread to others, especially to young professors who by choice or decanal edict
find themselves now or in the future teaching Criminal Law for the first time.1
* Frank R. Strong Chair in Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, Ohio State University. I
appreciate helpful comments on an earlier draft by colleagues Kate Federle and Larry Herman. I
can be contacted at dressler.11@osu.edu.
1. I have taught criminal procedure courses during the same period, and love them as well.
As I note in Part I infra, however, students are more easily attracted to criminal procedure than to
its substantive cousin, and I have found during the years that many young professors who are
inclined to teach in the criminal field have the same preference. They ask to teach Criminal
Procedure but sometimes have to be assigned to Criminal Law. That bias is breaking down, in
part I suspect because the constitutional law aspects of criminal procedure seem less exciting now
than during the heady days of the Warren Court (and even in the post-Warren Court 1970s and
early 1980s), and because a great deal is percolating through the substantive area as a result of
challenges to the status quo brought by feminists and adherents of other critical intellectual
movements.
There are other events that make substantive criminal law potentially more interesting to
academics than in the past. For example, the American Law Institute’s recent decision to develop
new sentencing provisions of the Model Penal Code (see AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE:
SENTENCING REPORT (2003)) has prompted interest in, and debate regarding, the creation of a
Model Penal Code Second, which could reshape the criminal law. See, e.g., Symposium, Model
Penal Code Second: Good or Bad Idea?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 155, 155-244 (2003).
Also, lest I be misunderstood, I don’t consider substance and procedure dichotomous
fields, even if the classes we teach sometimes give that impression. For example, what is the
subject of sentencing: substance or procedure? Of course, it is both. And nobody can truly
appreciate the significance (and weaknesses) of the constitutional cases relating to the
“procedural” issue of “burden of proof, without understanding “substantive” criminal law, the
definitions of specific offenses, and the meaning of the concept of crime.” E.g., Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (determining when a state may constitutionally allocate to the
defendant the burden of persuasion regarding an issue properly before the fact-finder); Mullaney
1143
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My second goal (closer to the Law Journal’s wishes) is to describe the
three Criminal Law classes (or, more accurately, topics) I most enjoy teaching
and, in the process, offer a few hopefully useful pedagogical suggestions.
When I pondered this aspect of the essay and made my subject matter choices,
I noticed certain commonalities: (1) two of the topics allow me to sensitize my
students to moral theories of criminal responsibility and punishment, and to
show even the most pragmatic of my students why they should care about
these theories;2 (2) they are all hot-button topics that regularly get students
excited and agitated; (3) relatedly, all three topics involve feminist challenges
to prevailing (or once prevailing) law, and (4) although I am sympathetic to
many feminist goals, I disagree in part with feminist critiques in these areas
and I enjoy expressing those doubts in class.
In short, the topics I most like covering are those that invite students to
become agitated, to become passionate, and to “get it on” with me. On
reflection, I guess my preference for stirring things up should not surprise me.
I will not bore you with my background, at least not in the text of this essay.3

v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (same). Moreover, changes in “procedural” rules inevitably
affect “substance” and vice-versa. If a legislature may not criminalize vagrancy, see Papachristou
v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), declaring a vagrancy ordinance violative of the due process
clause, you can expect that the police will be given greater authority to detain persons short of
arrest to accomplish the same result. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (authorizing brief
detentions of persons when officers reasonably suspect that crime is afoot, even when there are
insufficient grounds for arrest).
2. I vividly remember the day a student came up just before class and asked me,
contemptuously, why I was wasting his time discussing moral theories relating to concepts of
justification and excuse. Despite my consternation (is that a great way to start class, or what?), I
tried to give him a brief explanation. He stopped me midstream, did an abrupt about-face to
return to his seat (at least he didn’t walk out), and expressed under his breath (but I assume also
for my edification), “If I wanted a philosophy class, I would have gone for my Ph.D.” By the
way, that remark came from a student at an elite (supposed Top Ten) law school. Although my
experience suggests that the stereotype is generally true—the more elite the law school, the more
willing or even anxious students are to discuss theory—I have also learned that narrow-minded
students are found at all law schools, and that students anxious to broaden their horizons are also
found everywhere.
3. If your eyes dropped to this footnote, I can bore you (briefly) here. My parents were
fellow travelers of fellow travelers of the Left during the Depression, my criminologist father
earned the wrath of J. Edgar Hoover in the 1950s (I am not quite sure why) and was a vocal
advocate of prison reform in the 1960s (not insignificant because he had been Chief of Parole for
the State of New York in an earlier period), and all of this rubbed off on me. I resolutely (but
quietly) refused to salute the flag in my junior and senior high school classes, and I was a
Conscientious Objector during the Vietnam War. But, even during this period, I was
uncomfortable with the intellectual rigidity of many of my New Left colleagues, and my tolerance
for rigidity has grown thinner as I have grown older (and, uh, less thin). Indeed, I am never more
pleased than when one of my seminar students tells me that her views on a criminal law topic
have changed 180 degrees (and, I really don’t care which direction that puts her) as a result of
researching and thinking about her paper topic. My views on criminal law issues, too, have
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It is enough to say here that what makes teaching Criminal Law so much fun
for me, and I am sure for so many other veterans in the classroom, is the
chance to get students immersed in thinking about—and, hopefully, tackling
on a more-than-shallow level—some of the most provocative issues they will
confront in law school, while simultaneously learning some law.
I will keep my personal thoughts about Criminal Law (Part I) relatively
brief. In Part II, I provide an overview to my teaching strategy in my Criminal
Law class. I then describe my favorite classes (Parts III through V) and, in the
process, hopefully provide some useful pedagogical advice.
I. REMINISCING, ADVISING, AND A LITTLE CHEERLEADING
I have taught Criminal Law in twenty-six of my twenty-seven years of fulltime teaching at nine law schools (either as a visitor or tenure-track professor)
in five states and one Canadian province.4 In some schools, Criminal Law has
been a first-semester first-year class, in others a second-semester first-year
course.5 In most schools I taught a three-credit version of the subject; in a few
I have had the “luxury” of four credits. I suppose like most 1L professors, I
prefer teaching students in their first semester, when they are most excited and

changed during the years, sometimes requiring me to concede error (or, at least, change of heart)
in subsequent scholarship. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying
the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1361 n.175 (1989);
Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86
MINN. L. REV. 959, 962 (2002) [hereinafter Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?].
4. I have taught Criminal Law in California (McGeorge School of Law, University of the
Pacific, and two University of California branches [Berkeley and Los Angeles]), Minnesota
(Hamline University), Michigan (Wayne State University and the University of Michigan), and
Ohio (Ohio State University). I have taught other criminal-related classes at University of
California, Davis, University of Iowa, and University of British Columbia (as part of a summer
program run by Southwestern University).
5. Which semester is better? From a curricular perspective, I think the case for teaching
Criminal Law in the fall is strong. First, it is valuable for students to take a public law course at
the start of their law school career, especially because they are otherwise inundated with private
law subjects in the traditional first-year curriculum. Second, for students who are already
oriented toward public law when they enter, Criminal Law gives them a tid-bit early on, while
their excitement with law school is likely to be at its zenith. Third, Criminal Law might be the
best first-year substantive class for teaching students statutory analysis (through the use all
semester of the Model Penal Code found in almost every criminal law casebook, or with
supplementary materials linked to some actual state criminal code) along with the common-law
materials they will learn in all of their 1L courses. Fourth, probably better than any other firstyear course (except where Jurisprudence might be taught in the 1L curriculum), Criminal Law
familiarizes students with broad jurisprudential issues that any educated lawyer will confront in
her career. Finally, the fact patterns are usually (and, perhaps unfortunately) within the common
experience of most students or, at least, are familiar to them through the media and other cultural
venues.
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idealistic,6 although I am always struck by how much slower I must proceed,
and thus how much less I can cover, during the fall semester because of student
inexperience with the case method of learning.7
As a student at the University of California-Los Angeles, I learned
Criminal Law with the Kadish and Paulsen casebook, so I began teaching my
class as well with the Kadish and Schulhofer casebook.8 I think most
professors would agree that it is the classic in the field. Few casebooks
influence the way lawyers or scholars think about a subject, but this book
qualifies in that regard.9 I enjoyed teaching from it, but I found from student
evaluation forms that students were less happy with it than I was. In 1992 or
1993, I began teaching in part from my own materials, and in 1994 those
materials became my own casebook.10 Although I no longer teach from

6. I find student morale—and, thus, class participation—erodes appreciably in the second
semester, when grades from the fall semester are distributed and the ninety percent of the class
that expected to be in the top ten percent, but are not, rethink their position. And, of course, a
certain level of fatigue sets in for everyone in the second semester, regardless of class rank. It is
as if the intellectual adrenaline tank is now at one-quarter level, and students are pacing
themselves, as they know they must be mentally prepared for final exams. Also, at least in my
experience, it seems that law schools often give 1L students a heavier load in their second
semester—an extra unit or two, or more time-consuming work in legal writing than they had in
their first semester. This factor alone cuts into student time for class preparation and energy.
7. In my teaching experience, the four-unit version of Criminal Law has always been a fall
semester phenomenon. I cover only slightly more material in those four units in the fall than I
can cover in three units in the spring, all else equal. Needless to say, a three-unit fall class allows
a teacher very little opportunity to give her students either the breadth or depth of coverage she
desires or requires.
8. The first edition of the casebook, Criminal Law and Its Processes, published in 1962,
actually was the Paulsen and Kadish casebook, with then co-author Monrad G. Paulsen listed
first. The names were reversed for the second edition, by the time I took Criminal Law in 1970.
Upon Professor Paulsen’s death, Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer joined the casebook on the
fourth edition in 1983. It is now in its seventh excellent edition, published in 2001.
9. Perhaps (as my colleague Kate Federle suggests) the following point deserves more than
a footnote: It is not simply, or even primarily, casebooks that shape the way lawyers and scholars
think about the law; it is the classroom professor who is the greatest influence. By our selection
of casebooks, by our decisions on what cases to cover and which ones to omit, and most of all by
the particular ways in which we ask our students to think about the cases, we are shaping our
students’ thought processes and, whether by choice or not, their ideas about the law.
This is not to say that our students arrive in a tabula rasa state. Far from it. And, in any
intellectually diverse classroom, these students’ ideas and prior experiences will also help shape
the learning process. Nonetheless, the teacher directs the classroom discourse, brings her or his
expertise to the conversations, and, simply by these facts alone, has a disproportionate influence
on students’ thinking about the more subtle aspects of the law. That is why teaching—in law
school, yes, but even more so in the elementary, secondary, and undergraduate phases—is such
an exhilarating—and yet hopefully humbling—experience.
10. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (1994). The casebook
is now in its third edition.
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Kadish and Schulhofer, as my casebook preface indicates, I am indebted to
their book.11
Students at every law school at which I have taught have found Criminal
Procedure—specifically the police practices version of the course—their
favorite criminal justice course (and, often, their favorite class in law school
generally). Most students come into that class ready to enjoy it—after all, it is
cops and robbers, NYPD Blue, and Law and Order for three units. I have
found that most students do not come into Criminal Law with this same
positive attitude.12 And yet, it is this course that I most love to teach.
I am irked that many law faculties have historically treated Criminal Law
with relatively little respect. In the not-too-distant past, Torts, Contracts, Civil
Procedure, and even Property were accorded five or six first-year credits while
Criminal Law, if a first-year class at all, received three units. What does this
tell new students? Seemingly the message is that these other subjects are twice
as important (and what does this say about the public versus private law
dichotomy?), or that they are twice as difficult,13 or perhaps that there is twice
as much law to learn in those subjects. Of course, none of this is true, but the
fact remains that criminal law historically has been viewed as the “grubby”
area of the law that true “gentlemen” did not aspire to practice. And yet, it is
Criminal Law that probably best teaches 1Ls the critically important skill of
statutory analysis, and I don’t think there is a better basic substantive course
for familiarizing students with political, moral, and legal theory.14

11. Id. at ix (“With the publication of my own casebook comes my professional bar mitzvah,
but I can think of no higher accolade than if someone were to say of this book, ‘Why, it is a sonof-Kadish (and Schulhofer).’”).
12. This attitude is not peculiar to my experience, nor is it just a recent phenomenon. See
Sanford H. Kadish, Why Substantive Criminal Law—A Dialogue, Address at the Eighteenth
Cleveland-Marshall Fund Visiting Scholar Lecture (May 13, 1980), in 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1
(1980) (responding, through fictional dialogue, to criticisms of the course and subject matter
expressed by students to the author over many years).
My colleague Larry Herman suggests another reason for students’ (and his own)
preference for Criminal Procedure. At least as to the police practice version of the class, it
primarily involves a single system (federal constitutional restraints) over which a single court
(United States Supreme Court) ultimately presides. As Larry has put it to me, “it is fun to
observe and analyze the progression (or retrogression) of cases. By contrast Criminal Law is
unwieldy—one case from California, another from Pennsylvania, a third from New York.”
13. I remember a comment from a former colleague of mine—a former civil practitioner—
unfortunately made only partly in jest: “You don’t even need three units. Just tell your students
that they are lucky that states now have a penal code, and point them to it. What is so difficult to
understand about the criminal law?” I told my colleague, not in jest, that I hoped nobody would
ever ask him to teach Criminal Law or, worse, come to him needing advice on a criminal law
matter. As he was a tenured member of the faculty, and I was not at the time, I smiled as I said it.
Inside, I was steaming.
14. See supra note 5.
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The curricular bias against Criminal Law persists today, although less so
than when I started teaching. A substantial minority of law schools now
allocates four credits for the course. I suppose I should not incite rebellion, but
I urge those of you required to teach Criminal Law in a three-unit version to try
to raise your faculty’s openness to the idea of adding one unit to the course.15
As I say, many of my Criminal Law students do not come to the class
expecting to be excited, even though (or is it because?) it involves the rawest
material—for example, cannibalism,16 euthanasia,17 rape, tragic abuse of

15. As any veteran of the curricular wars knows, it is extremely difficult to make changes in
the first-year law school curriculum. Adding one unit to one subject will usually require taking
away a credit from another subject, and my experience is that it is a rare professor willing to say
that her subject should be the one sacrificed. Thus, changes of the sort I am suggesting typically
occur as part of broader first-year curricular reform, perhaps by removal of credits from all of the
other first-year classes, the addition of a fourth unit to Criminal Law, and the inclusion of another
class (for example, a course in professional ethics, statutory interpretation, or jurisprudence) in
the first-year menu.
As hard as the process of getting a four-credit Criminal Law class might be, it is not
insurmountable, as evidenced by the trend toward four credits. If you are inclined to make the
effort, I have a few suggestions. First, of course, get together with the other criminal law
professors to be sure you are (or can come to be) on the same wavelength. If you folks don’t
agree, you can hardly expect support from the faculty.
Second, develop the arguments for the additional unit that seem most persuasive given
your law school’s situation. One law school I know had an historically strong “private law” bias
that newer faculty, including a fair number of non-criminal law professors and the dean, wanted
to reverse. Thus, the public law versus private law argument had the potential to convince some
persons, even some 1L professors “negatively” affected, to support change. Another law school
might find arguments based on the job market—job availability in the criminal law area—to
support more emphasis on criminal law classes. And so on.
Third, don’t just come to the appropriate academic committee requesting an additional
unit. Provide some alternative models of how this change can be fit into the 1L schedule. Can
the extra unit be added without taking away from others, or will this extra credit put too much of
a load on your students? If the unit added requires a unit taken away, how will you handle this
problem? Perhaps you know that there are some 1L professors who have agitated for other types
of first-year reform, who could join you in support of the additional unit because it would be part
of some larger reform.
Warning: If prior experience is any indication, if you succeed in getting the extra unit,
Criminal Law will be placed (if it was not already there) in the fall semester. As I have
mentioned, see supra note 7, a four-unit fall version of Criminal Law provides only minimal
space for additional coverage, if you are currently teaching the three-unit version in the spring. I
still think the change is worth the effort because you get students with a more positive attitude to
learning, you do get to cover a little more material (or go deeper into the same material), and your
law school will be sending a valuable message about the importance of the subject and public law
generally. (Of course, if you currently teach Criminal Law as a three-unit fall class, the added
unit will be a true blessing.)
16. The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884).
17. People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001).
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children,18 and the like—they will read in their law school careers. But, as I
tell my students on the first day, what is so special about Criminal Law is not
simply that it involves, literally, life-and-death issues, but that it is a course
where they will have the opportunity to reflect on the truly Big Questions—the
questions that not only lawyers, but also theologians, poets, geneticists, social
scientists, and just plain folk, have been contemplating for centuries. It is
Criminal Law, after all, where students consider issues of right and wrong, as
well as matters of personal and social responsibility for wrongful conduct. It is
Criminal Law that asks such questions as: What types of conduct merit
enforcement through the criminal law? When is the infliction of pain through
punishment justifiable? When is it just to hold a person legally accountable for
the actions of another? When is intentionally taking human life proper, or at
least tolerable, and why? When should people be free from moral censure for
concededly wrongful conduct? At what point is it proper for society to
intervene and punish for inchoate conduct? Free will versus determinism.
Feminism versus multiculturalism. Retributivism versus utilitarianism. Rawls
versus Hobbes. And so on, and on and on. So many old and contemporary
conflicts.
This is a great subject! I feel blessed that I have been able to teach it for
so many years. For those of you who are at the early stages of your Criminal
Law journey, treasure the opportunity.
II. MY CLASS GOALS
Students sometimes complain that I try to do too much in my Criminal
Law class. If you glance at the preface to the first edition of my casebook, you
will see the basis for their complaints. I state there what I think matters:
doctrine, penal theory, appreciating the relevance of other disciplines in
formulating sensible criminal laws, statutory analysis, and “thoughtful, wide-

18. As an author looking for pedagogically useful cases to include in a casebook, I have read
more child abuse (and child homicide) cases than I ever expected or wanted to. Those were the
cases that I found emotionally hardest to stomach; some of the cases I read brought me to tears,
and I omitted the use of some otherwise pedagogically useful child abuse cases because the facts
left me up at night. Nonetheless, some such cases made it into my casebook. E.g., Oxendine v.
State, 528 A.2d 870 (Del. 1987) (in which the court reports that the homicide victim, a six-yearold boy, was heard by a neighbor crying, “Please stop, Daddy, it hurts”). I continue to receive
unsolicited comments from some casebook users suggesting I omit these cases. The problem, of
course, is that any class covering Criminal Law is replete with awful crimes, so there is no
sensible way to protect readers from this reality, nor should we. To the extent that some students
dislike Criminal Law because of the ugliness of the cases, I understand their feelings even as I
compel them to confront them, as lawyers must do. Nonetheless, we need to be especially
sensitive to the possibility, even probability over time, that we will have students who, as a result
of being direct or indirect crime victims, will become overwrought (what if they are survivors of
child abuse?) by some of the cases in the class. See infra note 67.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1150

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:1143

open, and relevant” discussion of controversial topics.19 You cannot do all of
this, all of the time, but I try to do a lot of it, much of the time. I urge you to
do the same, although each of us must choose her or his own weighting of
these elements, depending on scholarly interests, student abilities, and
pedagogical philosophy.
There is never enough time in any class, and especially Criminal Law
(even in the four-unit version), to teach everything that is found in any
casebook. Choices must be made, and I always find those choices painful,
somewhat like deciding which of my children to pay attention to and which
ones to ignore.20 In terms of coverage, like most professors and casebooks, I
emphasize the general part of the criminal law, that is, the basic doctrines that
apply regardless of the crime. As for the special part, the only completed
offenses I emphasize are murder, manslaughter and rape, although students
will certainly learn the definitions, without the complexities, of other major
offenses along the way.21
Teachers of 1L courses know that a primary goal of any first-year class is
to teach lawyering skills (“thinking like a lawyer”). This means that we cannot
teach as much doctrine in the first year as in an equivalent upper-division
course. And, because doctrine changes over time, no law school course should
ever be focused too much on these basics. That being said, I want my students
to leave my classroom with a reasonable grounding in doctrine. Indeed—and
here is where students start to complain—I warn students on day one that they
will be held responsible for two sets of doctrine, the common law and the
Model Penal Code, the former because the roots of our penal law come from it,
and the latter because it is a wonderful tool for critiquing the common law, for
seeing where modern law is moving, and for helping students learn skills of

19. DRESSLER, supra note 10, at v-vi.
20. As a casebook author, I need to experience my entire casebook in the classroom, so I
teach every page of my casebook during a four-year period. I cover some topics every year (for
example, basic theories of punishment, voluntary act and omission requirements, basic mens rea
concepts, mistake of fact and law, causation, criminal homicide, rape, self-defense, necessity,
duress, insanity, criminal attempts, and accomplice liability), although not necessarily every case
in my book relating to the topic, and then I cover the omitted materials rotationally during the
four years, making room when needed by skipping a little of the previously mentioned materials.
Of course, you can decide “permanently” to skip materials you find less interesting or important,
but there is something to be said, if only to avoid intellectual stagnation, with varying your
syllabus this way, over time.
21. Professor Douglas Husak has written that criminal theorists spend too little time
attempting to develop a theory of criminalization that could help reverse the exponential increase
in the number of criminal statutes in the United States. Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law
Important?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 261 (2003). In personal conversations with me, he has
criticized many casebooks, including my own, for failing to focus on the criminalization issue,
and especially for ignoring drug offenses, which are a far greater real-world factor in the criminal
justice system than any of the offenses we teach.
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statutory interpretation. As much as I care about theory, I am sufficiently
grounded in the real world that I want students to have the opportunity, if they
work at it, of leaving my class with enough basic substantive knowledge that if
they choose to practice criminal law, they can say that at least some of the
substantive law they confront daily looks at least a little bit familiar.
I also want my students to leave class prepared to be policy-makers,
whether this occurs in the courtroom, in government, or simply as opinionmakers in their community. This means that I want them to have the tools to
thoughtfully critique the criminal law. I believe that students ought to be
steeped in retributive and utilitarian theory so they can test every doctrine they
study against these penal theories. I tell my class in the first week that the
theories of punishment are the most important tools they will use all semester.
If a rule is not defensible under either theory, this should trigger concern on
their part. If a doctrine is only defensible under retributive theory, for
example, but is being rationalized by courts or legislators on utilitarian
grounds, bells should go off. If a particular criminal law doctrine is only
justifiable under one penal theory but interrelated doctrines are founded on the
other penal theory, they should worry that lawmakers might have developed a
self-defeating set of principles.
In my classes, almost all of the doctrinal analysis during the semester is
done through the dual lenses of retributivism and utilitarianism, although
sometimes we turn to political theory as well.22 I also make a few other
overarching points during the semester, one of the most important of which is
this descriptive one: Although the criminal law does not seek to punish
everything that is considered immoral (thank goodness), and not everything
that is punishable involves morally wrongful conduct (perhaps unfortunately),
a criminal code is as close as we come in our secular legal system to a moral
code. The criminal trial, therefore, is something of a morality play. This
means that as long as this description remains relatively accurate and we don’t
seek to separate the criminal law from moral considerations, we should care
about whether the penal code accurately expresses society’s moral sense. In
turn, this means that lawmakers and lawyers—and students—should care about
moral theories; and as lawyers we need to use the tools of our profession—
words—with care so that moral judgments are expressed accurately.23 This

22. Of course, as I proceed I add more than a few comments on the need for realism about
what actually occurs in legislative halls and courtrooms. I find, however, that students usually
come to law school well-equipped with skeptical, even cynical, views about the law and lawmaking, so I do not need to feed them too much of this. In any case, I want them to retain at least
a little idealism by suggesting that moral theories and principled analysis of the law matter or, at
least, should matter.
23. For example, lawyers should appreciate the distinction between saying that a homicide is
“justifiable” (proper, good, or, at least, tolerable) or that it is “excusable” (the homicide is wrong,
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also means that those concerned about the criminal law should be cognizant of
matters that might affect moral judgments, including what the “hard” and
“soft” sciences might teach about human conduct, what literature explicates,
and what history might inform us about the human condition. Of course, a law
class cannot be all things to all people, but I want students to appreciate the
interdisciplinary nature of the enterprise, and to come to the issues of criminal
law with appropriate humility.
III. THE PROVOCATION CASES
I love teaching (and writing24) about provocation. For me, there are two
great pedagogical aspects to the topic: It is my first opportunity to sensitize
students to the difference between justification and excuse defenses, a matter
of importance in my classroom, and second, this is the first (but hardly last)
time I bring feminist considerations to the classroom.25
A.

Justification versus Excuse: The First Experience

Although there are not perfectly clear lines between justification and
excuse defenses,26 most lawyers, courts, and casebooks make too little of the
difference.27 My students are cognizant of the distinction by the end of the
semester.28 I want students to appreciate the importance of distinguishing
but the actor is morally blameless for causing it). Although it is a bit too simplistic to put it this
way, “justifications” focus on the act, and “excuses” focus on the actor.
24. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a
Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982); Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Partial
Justification or Partial Excuse?, 51 MOD. L. REV. 467 (1988); Joshua Dressler, When
“Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual
Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995);
Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 3.
25. I typically spend two to two and one-half sessions on provocation, divided into three
segments: (a) teaching the common law basics and discussing the rationale of the defense; (b)
focusing on the objective standard of the doctrine, i.e., determining who or what constitutes the
“reasonable” or “ordinary” person who is provoked, and (c) covering the expanded and
controversial Model Penal Code version of the defense, which nicely leads into arguments for
outright abolition of the defense.
26. See Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1897 (1984); see also Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in
the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61
(1984).
27. I have previously provided examples of the legal profession’s failures in this regard.
Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature,
33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1160-61 (1987). There is somewhat greater attention to the distinction
today, at least in various casebooks.
28. I jokingly tell students that they will be dreaming—having nightmares?—about the
concepts by the end of the semester. In fact, I expect students to use the words “justification” and
“excuse” correctly by the end of the year, and almost all do.
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between (as I put it in class) “J” and “E” as a means of sending accurate moral
messages.29 I also want them to see that this distinction can have practical
legal significance to a trial lawyer. Students will immerse themselves in this
distinction later in the semester, but I give them a taste of it here, early on.
It almost doesn’t matter with what case you begin, but I start the
provocation materials with what might be characterized as a typical case: a
male killing a female in an alleged provocation as the result of a domestic
dispute. I use Girouard v. State,30 a case in which the defendant’s wife, after
just a few months of marriage, told her husband that she no longer loved him
and, after being questioned by the defendant about this, jumped on his back on
the bed, pulled his hair, and taunted him (“What are you going to do, hit me?”
and “I never did want to marry you and you are a lousy fuck and you remind
me of my dad [whom she despised for impregnating her]”).31 A few moments
later, the defendant entered the kitchen, obtained a kitchen knife, returned to
his wife, and after she verbally provoked him further, he stabbed her to death
and then slit his own wrists.32
After developing the basic principles of the defense—most notably that the
defense only applies if there is adequate provocation (emphasis on “adequate”)
and insufficient cooling-off time—I ask the obvious question: Why is an
intentional killing ever reduced to manslaughter? By now students have
learned that many state criminal codes divide murder into degrees and that a
sudden-provoked killing will typically reduce the offense from first-degree to
second-degree murder, but why as a policy matter should it be reduced further
to “mere” manslaughter? Why should the law “reward” persons for “failing to
keep their cool?,” I ask.
This line of questioning and the facts of Girouard allow me to begin
developing the competing views of the defense. I provocatively (no pun
intended) ask students, for example, whether victim Joyce Girouard “asked for
it” by her conduct.
Some students understandably object to this
characterization, but I “defend” my position by reminding students of trial
testimony, reported in the appellate opinion, by a psychologist that Joyce had a
“‘compulsive need to provoke jealousy.’”33
The point of this discussion is to show students that, at least subliminally,
the defense might be based in part on the principle that the victim partially (it
is, after all, only a partial defense, in that it only results in mitigation of guilt
and not full exculpation) deserved to die, that her (and so often, it is a female
who is killed) actions invited this response, that her death does not constitute

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

For the most basic distinction, see supra note 23.
583 A.2d 718 (Md. 1991).
Id. at 719.
Id. at 720.
Id.
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the same level of social harm as the death of an “innocent” person. In short,
this interpretation suggests that provocation is a partial justification for a
homicide. This characterization upsets many students, which is my purpose.
This leads me simultaneously in two directions: to see if the class can develop
an alternative and better explanation for the provocation doctrine, and to
consider criticisms, particularly of a feminist nature, of the defense.34
If the discussion has focused too much on the justification side of the
defense line, I ask: “If the rationale of the defense is that the victim partially
deserved to die, then why is there a requirement that the defendant act in a
state of passion, that he not have had time to cool off?” This question
demonstrates that there is a potential excusatory explanation of the defense,
i.e., the fact that the defense involves “heat of passion” shows that the defense
focuses, at least in part, on the defendant’s emotional condition, which is a
feature of excuse defenses.
Of course, at this stage of the semester, the concepts of “justification” and
“excuse” are foreign to the students, so this is why I lay out the
justification/excuse distinction at this point (promising them a lot more is
coming),35 and I let students see how the defense can potentially be explained
on either ground as, hopefully, class discussion has shown by now, albeit
probably without use of these magic “J” and “E” terms.
It is here that I can develop the two justification/excuse points I try to
make during the semester—the importance of sending the proper moral
message and the practical significance to lawyers of the distinction. I want
students beginning to think about the possibility that the claim that a provoker
deserves, even partially, to die for her misbehavior is far more morally
troubling than the excuse-based claim that, all else equal, a person who is
seriously provoked to kill is less blameworthy because of an understandable
loss of self-control than one who kills calmly.
I can make this argument fairly persuasively, and simultaneously show
students the practical significance of the defense, by using a hypothetical,
which is a variation on the facts in Regina v. Scriva:36 Father (F) and Daughter
(D) are walking along the side of a rural road. F observes a car, driven by S,
approaching and veering unsafely. F moves D further to the side but before he
can protect her, S (who is drunk) runs over and kills D with his car. S’s car
runs into a tree, immobilizing him. F, enraged and grief-stricken, pulls a knife
from his jacket and moves toward the car with the intention of stabbing S. As

34. I hold off much of the outright critique of the defense to the next class session. See
supra note 25.
35. My casebook includes a brief explanation of the justification/excuse distinction in the
provocation context, but a professor can simply lecture briefly on the point, if needed. JOSHUA
DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 264-67 (3d ed. 2003).
36. [No 2] (1951) 1951 V.L.R. 298.
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he does this, Bystander (B), who observed all of the preceding events,
intercedes to prevent the stabbing. F intentionally stabs B to death.
F is prosecuted for murder of B but wishes to claim he is guilty only of
heat-of-passion manslaughter. In Scriva, on roughly these facts, the issue was
whether this defense could be raised, i.e., whether the jury should be instructed
on provocation. I ask students to articulate the arguments they would make to
the judge to permit, and alternatively to refuse, a provocation instruction. It is
wonderful here to see the light bulbs go on above the heads of so many
students. If the earlier justification/excuse discussion seemed a bit too abstract
for some, now it is clearer. They see that there is no plausible way to argue
that B’s death was even partially justified, but students typically feel
compassion for F and understand how he could have been in such a state of
grief that he could not control himself when B stood between him and the killer
of his daughter. Students can appreciate how his level of self-control would be
undermined in a way that might make him less blameworthy than the usual
intentional killer.
Thus, simultaneously, students see how the
justification/excuse distinction has practical significance (a jury instruction on
manslaughter should be given if, but only if, the defense is a partial excuse),
and they see from an overarching policy perspective how the provocation
defense can more easily be accepted if it is understood in excusing, not
justificatory, terms.
Typically, I succeed in getting the justification/excuse concepts in the
students’ minds. When I return to these concepts later in the semester, students
have the provocation discussion, including the importance of drawing
distinctions, fairly well-etched in their minds.
B.

The Feminist Critique

The preceding Scriva hypothetical somewhat blunts the feminist critique of
the provocation defense, but I don’t want students to get too far from the
criticism, for it is an important one. As feminists have pointed out, most users
of the defense apparently are men, and a disproportionate number of the
victims in provocation cases are females37 or a male killed because of his
conduct in relation to a “significant female” (for example, a wife, girlfriend,
sister, or daughter) of the provoked killer. Thus, to many feminists, the
defense is not much more than an unjustified testosterone-inspired defense that
promotes or, at least, partially condones, male violence in response to personal
loss and insults to their pride.
I think the best way to get students focused on the feminist critique is to
move beyond Girouard (although it nicely makes the point) and consider the
Model Penal Code’s even more expansive “extreme mental or emotional
37. Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense,
106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1335 (1997).
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disturbance” defense.38 People v. Casassa39 nicely gets us back on message
(or issue, at least): Casassa brutally killed Victoria Lo Consolo for no better
reason than that she spurned his affection.40 The proverbial final straw
occurred when she rejected a gift he offered her.41 The case is unfortunate
from one pedagogical perspective: The defendant’s claim seems more properly
characterized as diminished capacity than provocation.42 But, the fact that the
Model Penal Code would allow the defense to be raised (to become a jury
issue) in a case like this—where the “provocation” is nothing more than a
female’s legitimate desire to make clear to the defendant that she does not want
a relationship with him—clearly focuses attention on the controversial nature
of the defense. It is here that I bring to the students’ attention the findings of
Professor Victoria Nourse that the Model Penal Code version of the defense is
often used by a man who has killed in response to nothing more than legitimate
efforts at separation by his female victim.43 Although Nourse does not use
these findings to argue for outright abolition of the provocation defense, I want
students to seriously consider such a possibility, even though it is one I
ultimately reject in my own scholarship.44
Class discussion usually is very good. Critics of the defense, either from a
feminist or law enforcement perspective, typically make utilitarian arguments
for its abolition; defenders of the provocation doctrine usually provide
retributive just-deserts, excuse-based arguments. Students, therefore, see how
these competing theories of punishment inform their discussion. Student
comments also tend to touch upon nature-or-nurture ideas: do men primarily
turn to violence, whereas women do not, because of testosterone (in which
case it might be unfair to ignore the biological explanations for the conduct), or
is it because our culture promotes male violence (in which case we might want
to abolish the defense to promote a different value system)?
I never feel we have enough time for the provocation defense. But, I
justify (not excuse) the time I give it because it is a wonderful opening for
what is to come, both in terms of justification and excuse discussion and
feminist criticisms of prevailing law.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1985).
404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980).
Id. at 1312.
Id.
Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 3, at 987–89.
Nourse, supra note 37, at 1342–51.
Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 3.
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IV. BATTERED WOMEN SELF-DEFENSE
This might be my favorite single class of the semester. I only give the
“battered woman” materials one class session,45 but I find that the discussion
stretches on outside of class, among students themselves and in the hallways
and my office for days thereafter.46 This is a class where I want students to
think about why we justify self-defensive killings, and it is another good place
to get students considering the importance of the justification/excuse
distinction. Most especially, this is a place for students to consider feminist
challenges to self-defense law as it has developed. As with provocation law, I
believe the feminist challenges are important for what they show us about
criminal law doctrine; I also believe that the most extreme position taken by
some feminists—that battered women are justified in killing sleeping
abusers—should be rejected.
By the time we reach the battered women materials, students have learned
the basics of self-defense. Relevant to current discussion, they know that there
is an imminency requirement, but they also understand that the defense can be
based on a reasonable, yet inaccurate, belief that deadly force is necessary to
combat a supposed imminent attack. However, in teaching basic self-defense,
when I try to get students to tell me why—precisely why—killing a lethal
aggressor in self-defense is justified (and not merely excused), I usually have
difficulty getting them to articulate what seems to them to be self-evident.
Because one of my goals in the discussion of criminal law defenses is to get
my class to tackle that deeper question—why is killing another human being
ever justifiable?—and to see that there are both potential utilitarian and nonconsequentialist moral answers to the question,47 I carry this question along to
State v. Norman,48 the best battered-woman case I have found to date. Here,
students do provide answers, albeit conflicting ones, to the why-is-killing-inself-defense-justifiable question.

45. Ideally, I spend seventy-five minutes on the subject of battered women. In the past, I
was often able to have my three-unit criminal law class scheduled twice a week, which allowed
seventy-five minutes per session. These days at Ohio State, I teach my four-unit class three days
a week, which works out to seventy-minute sessions.
46. I also am a high-level user of The West Educational Network (TWEN) in my Criminal
Law classes. TWEN or its LEXIS counterpart is a topic all of its own. (If you would like to look
in on my TWEN activities in Criminal Law, let me know.) However, two of the “forums” I have
are “Dressler’s Musings” (in which I start a conversation on a subject from class and students
respond to me and each other) and “Student Musings” (in which students start their own criminal
law conversation unregulated by me), and discussion of battered women often continues there.
47. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 17.02 (3d ed. 2001)
(“Underlying Theories of ‘Justification’”).
48. 366 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (overturning Norman’s manslaughter conviction),
rev’d, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (reinstating the conviction). Students read both opinions.
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Norman involves awful facts. Defendant Judy Norman and her husband
J.T. were married twenty-five years, with four children, at the time of the
homicide.49 J.T. was an alcoholic who began beating his wife five years after
their wedding.50 According to the court:
[J.T.] Norman, himself, had worked one day a few months prior to his
death; but aside from that one day, witnesses could not remember his ever
working. Over the years and up to the time of his death, Norman forced
defendant to prostitute herself every day in order to support him. If she begged
him not to make her go, he slapped her. Norman required defendant to make a
minimum of one hundred dollars per day; if she failed to make this minimum,
he would beat her.
Norman commonly called defendant “Dogs,” “Bitches,” and “Whores,”
and referred to her as a dog. Norman beat defendant “most every day,”
especially when he was drunk and when other people were around, to “show
off.” He would beat defendant with whatever was handy—his fist, a fly
swatter, a baseball bat, his shoe, or a bottle; he put out cigarettes on
defendant’s skin; he threw food and drink in her face and refused to let her eat
for days at a time; and he threw glasses, ashtrays, and beer bottles at her and
once smashed a glass in her face. Defendant exhibited to the jury scars on her
face from these incidents. Norman would often make defendant bark like a
dog, and if she refused, he would beat her. He often forced defendant to sleep
on the concrete floor of their home and on several occasions forced her to eat
dog or cat food out of the dog or cat bowl.
Norman often stated both to defendant and to others that he would kill
defendant. He also threatened to cut her heart out.51

As for the homicide itself, during the two days preceding the killing, Judy
was subjected to J.T.’s usual treatment, but perhaps it was worse even by
previous standards: J.T. slapped Judy, threw a bottle at her, smeared food on
her face, burnt her with a cigarette, and threatened to “cut her breast off and
shove it up her rear end.”52 During J.T.’s last day on this earth, the police were
called three times, although they only arrived twice.53 The first time, an officer
advised Judy to file a complaint against her husband, but she explained that he
would kill her if she did that.54 The second visit occurred after Judy took an
overdose of “nerve pills.”55 Sometime later, Judy decided to take matters into
her own hands: she went to her mother’s house, obtained a gun, and shot her

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Norman, 366 S.E.2d at 587.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 588 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Norman, 366 S.E.2d at 588.
Id.
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husband while he slept.56 At trial, Judy claimed self-defense.57 Because she
could hardly claim that an actual imminent threat on her life existed—a
sleeping man is not an instantaneous threat—she supplemented her case with
expert testimony that she suffered from battered woman syndrome.58
Apparently this evidence was intended to show, among other matters, that as a
battered woman with the syndrome she could reasonably have believed that
J.T. represented an imminent threat. The trial judge, however, refused to
instruct the jury on self-defense.59
Students come primed to discuss battered woman syndrome, but I don’t let
them start there. I ask them to ignore the syndrome testimony, but to accept all
of the other facts, including (of course) that Judy Norman had been beaten and
degraded by her husband for years, including the hours immediately preceding
the homicide. I ask students whether Judy Norman had a valid common law
self-defense claim on those facts (the answer is no). I ask the same question
under the Model Penal Code (probably no). I then ask, should the law justify
what Judy Norman did. And now the discussion breaks open into a wonderful
flurry of yes-and-no responses. There are males and females on both sides of
the discussion. Students who would justify the killing—and sometimes I have
to remind them that they must ignore the syndrome evidence—come up with
various arguments, and almost always I can show them how their answers fit
one or another of the moral theories of justification I have asked them to
consider.
Perhaps the most common explanation I get is, in essence, that Norman
forfeited his right to life by his horrendous conduct. I ask those students
whether, if this is so, they would justify the homicide if Judy asked a brother to
commit the killing. If J.T. has forfeited his right to life—if his death does not
constitute a social harm—then it shouldn’t matter, should it, if her brother does
the killing? What if Judy hired a contract killer to commit the crime? Now
some students begin to rethink their position, or they seek to provide a
principled way to distinguish a homicide by Judy (or, perhaps, her brother)
from the contract killer. I also ask: What if just before she planned to kill J.T.,
he had suffered a debilitating stroke and no longer represented a threat to her
life? Many of the “forfeiture” students would not justify the killing now. I try
to show them that this would mean that the underlying justification for the
homicide really has less to do with forfeiture and more to do with either
utilitarian concerns of Judy’s safety or moral claims based on Judy’s right of
autonomy. From here we proceed to discuss those and other possible reasons
to justify the homicide, and I open up discussion to be sure that critics of

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 589.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 589.
Norman, 366 S.E.2d at 587.
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justifying the homicide get their full opportunity to explain why killing J.T. as
he slept should not be authorized by the law.
The discussion is, almost without exception, wonderful. The discussion
allows us to flesh out the various theories of justification that can explain the
defense of self-protection and they can see that if one takes a particular moral
theory and applies it to a specific case or class of cases, this can help them
(and, presumably, thoughtful lawmakers) decide how broadly or narrowly the
self-defense privilege should be drawn. They see a reason to care about the
“abstract” moral theories I have put in their way.
Inevitably during the free-wheeling discussion some students will either
explicitly argue that we should excuse, not justify, Judy Norman, or they make
an argument for justification that really sounds in excuse (“protecting yourself
is instinctual”).60 Perhaps when this happens, or later, I bring syndrome
evidence back into the discussion and ask whether such evidence really helps
support a justification claim or whether, instead, it has the unintentional effect
of pathologizing Judy Norman and her claim, thus converting the case more to
an excuse. In turn, this allows me to get students thinking about whether it is
better policy—or makes any real difference—whether we justify or merely
excuse Judy Norman. Students pretty clearly see that it does matter on a policy
level (some feel that it is important to send a message of support for battered
women through justification reasoning, while others feel that it is better for the
law not to promote or authorize non-confrontational killings).
As one final effort to have students appreciate the justification/excuse
distinction, I ask them then to think about one of the first publicized battered
woman cases, the so-called “burning bed” case in which a battered wife poured
gasoline over her sleeping husband and lit a match.61 What if he had
awakened, smelled the gasoline, observed his wife with the match, and put two
and two together and came up with four? Would he be justified in killing her
with his trusty gun under the pillow? Students’ eyes light up with recognition
of the problem: if self-defense is limited to the use of force against unlawful
threats, and if the battered woman is justified in killing her husband, then she
represents a lawful threat to him. Ergo, he would not be justified in protecting
himself with the gun. But, if she is only excused for killing him, then she does
represent an unlawful threat to him, and he would be justified in killing her.
Thus, the label of her conduct potentially matters.
Of course, Norman permits full discussion of feminist concerns about the
protection of battered women. In very recent years this discussion has allowed

60. Some students, of course, favor the outcome in Norman, i.e., conviction for some form
of criminal homicide. I make sure their views are heard, indeed, often early on in the discussion,
so as to force students who would acquit the defendant to defend their position against the
prevailing law.
61. FAITH MCNULTY, THE BURNING BED (1980).
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me the opportunity to test out my own approach to the issue, one that would
only excuse, not justify, some (not all) homicides in Norman-like cases, but
one that would not be linked to excuse-sounding syndrome claims.62 The case
also allows students to consider the arguments of some feminists that selfdefense law itself, independent of the battered women issue, is based on a
male-on-male combat model, and thus that various features of the defense—
most especially, the imminency requirement and the idea that use of a weapon
to respond to an unarmed threat represents disproportional punishment—
should be reconsidered. However one comes out on these issues, the
discussion gives credence to the importance of considering, if not inevitably
accepting, feminist (and, thus, by implication, other “outsider”) theories.
V. RAPE LAW
A.

Some Preliminary Comments

There is a fair amount of literature on the subject of teaching rape
materials,63 and no small amount of it has focused on whether the rewards (to
students) of teaching rape law outweigh its risks (to teachers). At least one
professor expressed published doubt that, in light of his teaching experiences,
he would teach it again.64 In my own situation, there have been incentives to
downplay the subject: I was told by one professor (who might represent a
silent, but significant minority) that he would never use my casebook—or any
other casebook, for that matter— if it even included a chapter on rape;65 a fist
fight once broke out outside my classroom, after a class on rape;66 I have been

62. See Joshua Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters: Reflections
on Maintaining Respect for Human Life While Killing Moral Monsters, in CRIMINAL LAW
THEORY: DOCTRINES OF THE GENERAL PART 259 (Stephen Shute & A.P. Simester eds., 2002)
(arguing for a duress-like excuse claim).
63. E.g., Kate E. Bloch, A Rape Law Pedagogy, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307 (1995); Susan
Estrich, Teaching Rape Law, 102 YALE L.J. 509 (1992); Kevin C. McMunigal, Reducing the
Risks and Realizing the Rewards: An Approach to Teaching Rape Law, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
519 (1997); James J. Tomkovicz, On Teaching Rape: Reasons, Risks, and Rewards, 102 YALE
L.J. 481 (1992).
64. Tomkovicz, supra note 63, at 506. Professor Tomkovicz recently informed me that
notwithstanding his earlier doubts, he continues to teach rape law, “with much success, I think.
At least no negative episodes or feedback of any sort. I am committed to keeping it in the
course.” E-mail from James Tomkovicz to Joshua Dressler (Apr. 29, 2003) (on file with author).
65. This professor explained that he did not want to teach any materials on rape. I am not
sure if he told me why, but my sense was that the subject simply made him uncomfortable. I
suggested that he could always skip the chapter on rape, but he said that if he did this, “some of
my students would complain.” He explained that if there were no rape chapter to delete, students
would not blame him for omitting the subject.
66. The fight broke out between two male students. One of them, who had always struck me
in class as a bit of a “frat boy,” had made a comment in class that another student, whose sister
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criticized by students for being too directive in the class discussion, and I have
been criticized by students for not controlling class discussion enough.67
So, am I masochist to say that the rape law materials provide some of my
favorite teaching experiences? I hope not. But, I must concede at the outset
that I would not feel quite as I do if I were teaching the subject at some law
schools,68 or if I were an untenured faculty member at an institution in which

had once been raped, interpreted as making light of the subject. I had not thought that Frat Boy’s
comment on rape was extreme; I suspect, therefore, that there was more to the story than this
single class comment. I could easily imagine that Frat Boy made more than his share of
immature comments outside the classroom on a number of topics. This was just the final straw
for the aggrieved student.
67. After the fistfight, some students blamed me for not having predicted potential problems.
These critics thought I should have said or done something early on to prevent the violence. The
year after the fistfight, I decided to make some comments at the start of the rape chapter in the
hope that my words would prevent joking or other trivialization of the subject. The difficulty
with this—and the basis for the new criticism I received from a number of students following my
comments—was that my remarks chilled free expression and treated them like children. (Of
course, although I did not say this, my comments had been inspired by a childish school brawl.) I
cannot say for sure, of course, whether my comments had the deleterious impact my critics
claimed, but I concede that class discussion that year seemed more constrained. I want students
to feel comfortable making thoughtful, unpopular comments on any subject, including rape law,
and my decision to issue a warning apparently constituted overkill.
I no longer make any special comments at the outset, and I have had no further problems
in the classroom that would have even remotely justified “a speech.” I have concluded that, at
least in the law schools at which I have taught, students willing to openly express adolescent
“rape is funny” comments are now rare (a victory of feminism). See infra note 80. I also believe
that a professor, simply by his or her natural control of the classroom, and by the seriousness that
he or she brings to the subject, can reduce the risk of inappropriate student remarks nearly to zero.
This does not mean, however, that there won’t ever be offense taken, hurt feelings felt,
or emotions frayed. Some students feel so strongly about the subject that they cannot easily
accept comments with which they disagree, and there will be students who have been sexually
assaulted or the victims of attempted assault, who may find class discussion traumatic. In my
mind, the former students should not be placated; the latter students need to have their concerns
handled with care and consideration. Sexual assault victims need to realize that there might be an
examination essay question dealing with rape, and thus they need to get whatever help is needed
(for example, through student counseling services) to prepare for this, but in the interim I have
always been prepared to let such students “have a pass” in the classroom on the subject, and even
to leave the room if needed.
68. I prefer not to get into specifics, but I found the atmosphere at one law school
unconducive to pleasant teaching of rape law because too many students were intolerant of
opposing views. Their rigidity to alternative ideas, expressed with considerable passion, deterred
many students who disagreed with them from talking. This was not a symptom of just one group
of students; it happened in more than one semester. This had little to do, really, with the rape
materials; it was present much of the semester and involved a dynamic that extended beyond my
classroom (indeed, throughout the law school) at the time. Having said this, I would still teach
the rape materials if I were teaching at that law school, even if I thought that this same dynamic
would be present, but I would probably be unable to say that teaching the materials was fun.
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my career depended on sterling teaching evaluations69 or, simply, if I were the
type of teacher who strives to avoid all possibilities of classroom friction. I
also believe that a professor’s gender has an impact: at least subliminally, all
else equal, female students will start with more positive expectations about
class discussion of rape with a female professor, and men may feel more
comfortable with a male teacher.70 For me, by the time we reach the rape
materials midway through the semester, my reputation with students provides
some immunity: female students, and feminists in particular, see me as
relatively open to their ideas; but, students have also seen that I reject some
feminist solutions in regard to provocation and battered women, so I am not
seen as falling into any particular camp. If I were seen by students, rightly or
not, as a rigid feminist or anti-feminist, I would not find teaching the rape
materials “among my favorite teaching experiences.” I would still teach the
subject, because the topic is too important and pedagogically valuable to avoid,
but I would not do so with as much gusto as I do now.
B.

Teaching the Subject

On average I spend four sessions on rape, covering most, but not all,71 of
my own casebook materials. Early on,72 I use a non-traditional means to delve
69. Although I greatly value teaching, I have always disagreed with those who put much
stock in student evaluation forms as a factor in the tenuring process. (I prefer serious yearly peer
evaluation.) Although in extreme cases student forms might red flag a serious teaching problem
(although, an attentive dean is likely to be aware of the problem anyway, as a result of individual
and repeated student complaints brought to her office), such evaluative data can have the
unfortunate effect of rewarding professors who try to please students rather than to challenge
them.
70. I once read a “rape” fact pattern a law professor had put together for her examination. I
was struck by its graphic nature. She received few, if any, complaints from her students. In great
part I am sure this is because students respected and trusted her good judgment, but I believe (as
does she, based on recent conversations) that she was protected, at least a bit, by the fact that she
is female.
71. Because of time constraints, I frequently omit the materials on fraudulent rape. If I am
falling behind schedule, very unhappily I also omit the rape-shield materials.
72. Before turning to the case materials, I start with some preliminaries. I contrast the
subject we just completed, which focused almost exclusively on the mens rea issues of dividing
criminal homicide into different offenses and degrees, with the study of rape, which primarily
focuses on the actus reus of the offense. As I explain, rape law discussion involves drawing
various dividing lines: between sexual conduct that does not justify the criminal sanction and
conduct that merits the intervention of the criminal law; and another line distinguishing between
criminal conduct justifying substantial penalties and that which does not.
I use some of the first class session to get students discussing what they perceive to be
the underlying harm of rape. In what way, if at all, is it any different than any other form of
harmful or offensive bodily contact—why is rape, in other words, treated so much more harshly
than battery? This permits discussion of feminist and other explanations of the offense of rape.
This discussion also ties in later to our conversation about the proper scope of a modern sexual
assault statute.
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into the doctrinal materials, using the Rusk case.73 My casebook includes the
majority and dissenting opinions of both the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals, which overturned the defendant’s conviction, and the Maryland Court
of Appeals opinion, which reinstated the conviction. This is a nice case
because it lays out what might be characterized as a pre-reform, but hardly
extreme, version of traditional rape law. I teach it through role-playing, a
method I am now convinced frees the entire class to talk more openly
throughout the rape chapter materials. It is also, simply, a nice change of pace
for everyone.
A week before we get to Rusk, I assign one student to serve as the
prosecuting attorney, and another as defense counsel.74 I always select a
female to serve as defense counsel, and a male to be prosecutor. If I know
enough about my students by this time, which I almost always do, I try to pick
those who will be compelled to defend propositions with which they probably
initially disagree. The lawyers are instructed to prepare closing arguments to
the jury in the Rusk case, using the facts and law set out in the opinions.75 On
the day of the trial or perhaps before, I select six students, three males and
three females, to serve as jurors. I am the trial judge, whose role simply is to
instruct the jury on Maryland law (which comes directly from the case) and on
the presumption of innocence.
In our mock trial, the “attorneys” give their closing arguments. By having
the students role play this way, I free them to make arguments that they might
not personally believe, or that they might believe but that they might not
otherwise express because of class social pressures. I briefly instruct the
jury,76 after which deliberations occur in front of the other students.77 After
I also raise briefly for discussion the arguments of a few feminist commentators that
acquaintance rape might be better deterred through civil suits than criminal prosecutions, or that it
is an offense better suited for non-incarcerative remedies. Finally, students also read brief
excerpts of the experiences of feminist criminal defense attorneys, who describe the tensions they
feel in rape cases given their feminist values and potentially conflicting ethical responsibilities to
their clients. Some students have told me they appreciated the latter materials because it
legitimated their own conflicting feelings.
73. Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (reversing a conviction for rape),
rev’d, State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981) (reinstating the conviction).
In the first two editions of my casebook, Rusk was the first substantive case in the rape
chapter, followed by State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984). In the third edition, I reversed
the order of these cases, and thus I start with Alston, which I cover in a traditional (Socratic)
manner as part of the first class session preliminaries. See supra note 72. I then turn to Rusk on
day two.
74. Approximately two weeks before the Rusk case, I tell my class of my role-playing plans
and seek volunteers to serve as attorneys. I get enough names to make a careful choice.
75. One nice feature of Rusk is that there is little disagreement about the then-applicable law
or of the basic facts of the alleged assault. The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence to
convict.
76. I sometimes select a foreperson.
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suitable time for deliberations, I ask the jury to vote. In the seven years I have
taught Rusk this way, at four law schools, I have never had a unanimous
verdict. In four of the trials, the vote was 3-3, and in the others it was 4-2 for
conviction.
With the role-playing completed, I resume teaching by providing my
observations of the students’ performances and then opening up discussion of
the case to the entire class. There is such a high class response that we never
finish in the allotted time, so I sometimes set this class up at a special hour
when we can run the class beyond its normal length, and even then students
carry on conversation with each other and me after class.78
Rusk works beautifully on many levels. First, a few students have the
opportunity to get a slight taste of what it is like to argue a matter to a jury. In
that regard, I always ask the student attorneys during the full-class discussion
whether they felt comfortable with the side assigned to them when they first
read Rusk. Far more often that not, they tell me they were not happy—as a
matter of personal predilection79 or because they felt they were assigned the
losing legal side. However, with just one exception in all of these years, the
student attorneys stated that by the day of trial they were convinced their
arguments for conviction or acquittal were the “right” ones. This is a chance
for students to learn a little about the psychology of being an advocate,
including the effects of cognitive dissonance.
The jurors, and perhaps the class as a whole, benefit from the deliberative
process. It brings home to some students what they already realized more
abstractly, namely, that a lawyer’s argumentation can affect the outcome
regardless of the facts. And, perhaps most demonstrably, the jurors focus a lot
on the instruction I give them on the presumption of innocence. The class gets
a chance to see how that presumption affects deliberations; they see as well
how student jurors can differ so much in terms of what constitutes
77. If you decide to follow this approach, think about the best way to physically structure the
role-playing. The most difficult issue is where to place the jurors. You will want the lawyers to
have eye contact with them during closing arguments, but you also need the jurors to be situated
so that their deliberations can be heard by the rest of the class. I have taught in classrooms that
are small enough, with good enough acoustics, to make this fairly easy; most classrooms,
however, do not lend themselves to an easy set-up. (On one occasion I reserved the Moot Court
room for this class session.) In the worst case scenario, I suggest bringing in six chairs, and
having three jurors seated facing the other three jurors in the front of the classroom, but with
enough distance between the three-seat aisles that they naturally have to talk louder to be heard
by the other jurors, so that the rest of the class also hears adequately. Even so, you should remind
the jurors to keep their voices up so they can be heard in the back of the classroom.
78. I don’t believe the role-playing works well when limited to an hour or less. Ideally, you
ought to give the attorneys fifteen minutes for their arguments (ten minutes would be the very
least they will need); then you would give jurors fifteen minutes for deliberation; the remaining
time would be used for full-class discussion.
79. Remember: I assigned a female to defend the accused rapist, and a male to prosecute.
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“reasonable” doubt. And, the best students often notice how jurors—even law
students—sometimes ignore or misunderstand jury instructions.
What is also great about Rusk is that in every trial there have been both
males and females voting to acquit, and to convict. In short, this case not only
isn’t a slam-dunk for either side, but because the jurors do not break down
stereotypically (women to convict, men to acquit), the verdict essentially
invites the class to speak their minds, less fearful of group (or gender) pressure,
as we turn in the remaining rape law classes to such controversial topics as
whether “no always means no” in sexual affairs, whether the criminal law
should punish males who have intercourse with females who don’t say no but
who also don’t say yes, whether the law should continue to recognize a
“defense” of reasonable mistake of fact in rape cases, whether sexual assault
law should expand beyond the area of forcible intercourse, and whether rapeshield laws unfairly restrict the ability of a defendant to cross-examine his
accuser and present his case for acquittal.80
VI. CONCLUSION
I love teaching. I most especially love teaching Criminal Law. After more
than a quarter century of teaching, I remain as excited about the subject as
when I first entered the classroom. The course allows law teachers to do
everything we would hope to do in a first-year class: teach doctrine and
statutory analysis, consider moral and political theory, demonstrate the value
of interdisciplinary research, and, not the least of which, provoke students to
wrestle with some of the deepest—and most ancient—issues we ever can hope
to confront in a law school classroom or elsewhere.
I hope this essay, more than simply providing readers with some perhaps
useful pedagogical suggestions, will inspire new (and, indeed, experienced)
members of the legal academy to choose Criminal Law as “their subject” for
teaching and serious scholarship.

80. For what it is worth, in the last three or four years of teaching rape law, I have found that
the divisions between male and female students in class are not nearly as bright as in the more
distant past. That is, more men are now sympathetic to feminist goals (or, at least, to law
enforcement goals generally), and an increasing number of women reject the most expansive
feminist arguments in the field. I cannot be sure, of course, if my experiences are random, but my
observations are based on teaching in the last four years in California, Michigan, and Ohio, in
public (Berkeley, Michigan, and Ohio State) and private (McGeorge) law schools.

